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COMMENT
TO THINE OWNSELF BE TRUE:1 IMF CONDITIONALITY




Prior to World War II, there was no international financial
system in existence.3 The International Monetary Fund ("IMF"),
designed to serve as the center of the postwar international
monetary system, was established to focus on member states'
Balance of Payments ("BOPs"),4 exchange rates, and exchange
controls. However, the IMF was not designed to influence member
states' domestic policies or priorities primarily because the
economic sphere was thought to be something that could be
separated from the areas of domestic governance. Gradually,
* J.D. candidate, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.B.A., Korea
University, 2000. I would like to thank my parents for all their love and trust; my
friends for their love and support; and all members of the Journal of International
Economic Law at the University of Pennsylvania for their hard work on this
Comment. I would also like to thank U Jin for his suggestions in writing this
Comment. Lastly, I wish to thank Sam for being the cat's meow.
I WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 1, sc. 3, 1. 81 (Philip
Edwards ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1985) (1602).
3 3 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965, TWENTY YEARS OF
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION pt. 3 Uohn Keith Horsefield ed., 1969).
4 The Balance of Payments ("BOPs") is a statistical statement that
summarizes the economic transactions of an economy with the rest of the world
for a specific period, typically a year or quarter. It covers: (1) all the goods,
services, factor income, and current transfers an economy receives from or
provides to the rest of the world; and (2) capital transfers and changes in an
economy's external financial claims and liabilities.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
however, it became clear that the barrier between domestic and
international policies could not be maintained. After the IMF
made loans to relatively industrialized countries 5 in the 1960s and
early 1970s, it was apparent that the borrowing countries were
subject not only to the laws of economics, but, to a considerable
extent, the judgments of the international community, represented
by the IMF. Thus, by the time Asia was struck by financial turmoil
in 1997, it was understood that the IMF, prior to making its
resources available, could ask for certain conditions from a
potential borrower-state. However, much of the IMF's
conditionality6 was focused on macroeconomic variables until the
Asian7 financial crisis. Unlike Mexico and other Latin American
countries, 8 Asian countries had experienced low budget deficits,
relatively low public debt, inflation in single digits, rapid economic
growth, and high savings and investment rates. It seemed, at least
to the IMF, that the cause of the Asian financial crisis was failure of
the internal management.9 The IMF thus looked closely at the
5 For example, Britain obtained an International Monetary Fund ("IMF") loan
in 1967 following the devaluation of the pound. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The
International Monetary System and the Erosion of Sovereignty: Essay in Honor of
Cynthia Lichtenstein, 25 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 257, 261 (2002).
6 Credit frbm the IMF is generally conditioned upon the borrowing country's
commitments to certain economic and financial policies. Conditionality refers to
this requirement by the IMF that the borrowing country should adopt policies to
resolve its BOPs difficulties, contribute to strong and sustainable economic
growth, and enable the government to repay the IMF. For a discussion of
conditionality, see The International Monetary Fund, IMF Conditionality: A
Factsheet, Dec. 4, 2002 [hereinafter IMF Conditionality], at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2003). Recently, the IMF
Board has revised the guidelines on conditionality stating that the revision was
made to focus more sharply on the conditions attached to its financing to be
clearer about the purposes of conditionality, and to be flexible and responsive in
discussing alternative policies with countries requesting financial assistance. See
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY (2002),
available at http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/09230
2.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
7 In this Comment, "Asia" refers to Southeast Asia and/or East Asia,
including countries such as Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
8 In August of 1982, Mexico was the first of the developing nations to receive
an IMF loan. Mexico also received another IMF rescue package following the
peso crisis in the winter of 1994-1995. See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF
DEPRESSION EcoNoMics 3845,52-57 (Norton Books 2000) (1999).
9 In its post-crisis analysis, the IMF characterizes the Asian financial crisis as
a capital account crisis. See THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE IMF AND RECENT CAPITAL ACCOUNT CRISES:
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private sector and secured commitments related specifically to
private activity. Declaring that the financial crises in Asia
stemmed from weaknesses in financial system and governance, the
IMF required an unprecedented broad range of structural reforms
in Asia, because it believed that no economic recovery was possible
without curing fundamental, structural "defects" in Asia. The IMF
has maintained that the clearest evidence that such reforms were
necessary in Asia was the successful recovery of the South Korean
economy by the end of 1999. The IMF's argument, then, was that
the policies and decisions that were normally within the purview
of purely domestic governance were a major contributor to the
subsequent economic woes. In effect, sovereignty of a nation
embodied within internal management and domestic policies was
something that the IMF had decided to modify at a fundamental
level, if deemed necessary.
However, the rather different outcomes in Malaysia and
Thailand' 0 suggest that the success of economic recovery does not
provide the justification of eroding sovereignty through the IMF
conditionality. Viewed from an economic standpoint, much of the
IMF conditionality was at least somewhat questionable for its
effectiveness, necessity, and justification. The IMF cannot provide
objective proof for its contention that its conditionality in fact
assists troubled economies in recovering quickly and effectively
from financial turmoil." Section 2 of this Comment examines the
INDONESIA, KOREA, BRAZIL [hereinafter CAPITAL AccoUNT CRISES] 12 (2003) (stating
that the crisis was caused by massive reversal of capital flows and contagion),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/20O3/cac/pdf/aU.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2003).
10 See PAUL KRUGMAN, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, in THE RETURN OF
DEPRESSION EcoNoMIcs [hereinafter KRUGMAN, Introduction] vii-xi (Norton Books
2000) (1999) (explaining that Malaysia had recovered from the crisis very quickly
even though the country did not follow the IMF's guidelines); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 126-27 (2002) ("Thailand followed the IMF
prescriptions almost perfectly. Yet more than three years after the beginning of
the crisis, it was still in recession....").
i1 "Thailand, though strictly followed the IMF conditionality, had been in a
deep economic recession for at least three years since 1997." STIGLrrZ, supra note
10, at 126-27. The Indonesian economy also suffered from lengthy depression and
political instability which were caused in part by the IMF conditionality.
Excessively austere policies -whether they be contractionary monetary
or fiscal policies in Argentina or cutting off food subsidies to the poor in
Indonesia -predictably give rise to turmoil. This is especially the case
when it is believed that there are massive inequalities -such as, billions
going to corporate and financial bailouts in Indonesia, leaving nothing
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creation of the IMF and its purposes, history, and development.
Section 3 examines the Asian economies before the crisis and
explores possible causes of the Asian financial crisis. In particular,
Section 4 discusses the South Korean economic crisis and the
conditionality imposed by the IMF in exchange for the rescue loan.
This section also criticizes and questions the IMF's "one-size-fits-
all" approach to every country in the region. Section 5 of the
Comment suggests changes in the IMF policies and its governance.
This Comment concludes, in Section 6, that the IMF's
conditionality is questionable in both a legal and an economic
sense. The IMF can potentially play a useful role in preventing
economic crises and helping crisis economies to recover by
focusing on its stated purposes in the Articles of Agreement. The
IMF should not be used to erode the sovereignty of the mostly
developing, borrowing countries in order to promote the interests
of the IMF itself or those of the developed countries.
2. THE IMF: ESTABLISHMENT, PURPOSES, AND EVOLUTION
2.1. Creation and the Purposes of the IMF
2.1.1. Creation
Following World War II, the international economic system
was redefined by the agreements of the United Nations ("U.N.")
Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods. These
agreements are known as the Bretton Woods system,12 which had
three pillars: the IMF, the International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development ("World Bank"),13 and the General Agreement on
left for those forced into unemployment.
fd. at 219.
12 The Bretton Woods system was based on stable and adjustable exchange
rates. Exchange rates were not permanently fixed; there were occasional
devaluations of individual currencies to correct fundamental disequilibria in the
BOPs. Ever increasing pressures in the 1960s culminated in the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system in 1971, and it was reluctantly replaced with a regime of
floating exchange rates. For a general discussion of the Bretton Woods system,
see Michael D. Bordo, The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical
Overview, in A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETrON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 3 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds.,
1993).
13 The World Bank was created to assist in the development process of
member states, specifically to arrange for loans intended to facilitate economic
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Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 14 These agreements came about after
the world realized that concerted efforts to finance the
reconstruction of Europe were necessary and that there might be
another Great Depression following World War II. It is very
important to remember that the U.N. Charter explicitly states that
matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state"15
are not the concern of any international organizations that were
created at the close of World War II. This language of the U.N.
Charter Article 2 is generally applicable to all U.N.-created
organizations.
2.1.2. Purposes
On July 22, 1944, the U.N. Monetary and Financial Conference
adopted the "Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund."16 Article I provides that the IMF was established:
a) to promote international monetary cooperation, exchange
stability, and orderly exchange arrangements;
b) to foster economic growth and high levels of employment;
and
c) to provide temporary financial assistance to countries to
help ease BOPs adjustment.'7
Therefore, its original mandates were enacted to enhance
global stability and to ensure that there were necessary funds for
countries facing a threat of recession to pursue expansionary
policies.
2.2. History and Development of the IMF
Although there have been some changes in the Bretton Woods
system in the last five decades, the system remains mostly intact.
For example, floating currency exchange rates have replaced fixed
rates pegged to gold,'8 and the IMF and World Bank now perform
projects.
14 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was the mechanism by
which states could resolve disputes and increase the volume of.international trade
through the lifting of national restrictions.
15 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
16 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945,
60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter Articles of Agreement], available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
17 Id. art. 1.
18 For a discussion of the gold-exchange standard, see Bordo, supra note 12.
2003
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some of each other's original functions. 19 However, one important
change is the IMF's stance towards its role in the international
monetary system. The IMF has taken the position that almost
everything falls within its domain, because almost any structural
issue could affect the overall performance of the economy. The
IMF remains stalwart in this claim, despite the fact that its role is
explicitly limited by the Articles of Agreement to matters of
macroeconomics when it deals with a country. 20
Since the mid-1970s, industrialized countries have ceased to
draw any resources from the IMF. Currently, developing countries
exclusively form the IMF's clientele,21 despite the fact that since its
inception, the IMF has never been viewed as having a specific role
in developing countries. 22  The Bretton Woods system was
designed by Western, 23 and, for the most part, developed countries
that were (and continue to be) committed to the principles of free-
market economics. Although the IMF conditionality remains
firmly founded on exchange rate devaluation and domestic
demand restraint 24 under the Articles of Agreement,25 in practice,
19 Although the purposes of the two institutions remained distinct, their
activities became increasingly intertwined:
[Tihe [World] Bank went beyond just lending for projects... to providing
broad-based support, in the form of structural adjustment loans; but it did
this only when the IMF gave its approval .... The IMF was supposed to
focus on crises; but developing countries were always in need of help, so
the IMF became a permanent part of life in most of the developing
world.
STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 14.
20 See Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. I; see also Graham Bird, The
International Monetary Fund and Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and
Policy Options, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD [hereinafter GLOBAL GOVERNANCE]
277, 307-08 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 2d ed. 2001) (explaining that the G-7 countries,
which include the United States, Japan, Germany, Canada, Italy, France, and the
United Kingdom, have encouraged the IMF to return to its core concern of
macroeconomics).
21 To most developing countries, the IMF is a lender of last resort. See Bird,
supra note 20, at 286 (explaining that most developing countries turn to the IMF
when all other financing options have been exhausted).
22 Id. at 277.
23 See Paul F. Diehl, Introduction to Part Four, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra
note 20, at 259 ("[The Bretton Woods) institutions... are still largely controlled by
the Western economic powers, either through formal voting procedures or by
virtue of their collective power in international economic relations.").
24 Bird, supra note 20, at 302.
25 See Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. V, sec. 3 (stating that the IMF
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conditionality has been used to promote the Washington
Consensus 26 reflecting market fundamentalist ideology.27  In
response, some developing countries have argued that the Bretton
Woods system was, at best, not designed to meet the needs of less
developed states, and at worst, designed to perpetuate the
dominance of Western countries. 28
It is important to remember that the concept of conditionality
under the Articles of Agreement maintains the implied
can place conditions on request for drawings); see also Guidelines on Conditionality,
Ex. Bd. Decision No. 6056-(79/38) (Mar. 2, 1979), in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 94 (1995) (stating that "[p]erformance criteria
will normally be confined to (i) macroeconomic variables, and (ii) those necessary
to implement specific provisions of the [Articles of Agreement] or policies
adopted under them.").
26 The term "Washington Consensus" was invented by economist John
Williamson to describe the lowest common denominator of policy advice being
addressed by the Washington-based institutions to be given to Latin American
countries as of 1989.
Williamson's ten policy prescriptions were:
(1) fiscal discipline;
(2) redirection of public expenditure;
(3) tax reform;
(4) financial liberalization;
(5) adoption of a single, competitive exchange rate;
(6) trade liberalization;
(7) elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment;
(8) privatization of state owned enterprises;
(9) deregulation of market entry and competition; and
(10) ensurance of secure property rights.
John Williamson, The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America, in LATIN AMERICAN
ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 351, 351-80 (John Williamson ed., 1990).
However, the term has more commonly been used to signify neo-liberal or
market-fundamentalist policies; see also John Williamson, What Should the World
Bank Think about the Washington Consensus, 15 THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH
OBSERVER 251 (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/
journals/wbro/obsaugOO/pdf/(6) Williamson.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
27 See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 220-21 (arguing that "market
fundamentalism," which is adopted and strongly promoted by the IMF, is not an
established doctrine, even among economists, but that it is a widespread view in
developed countries, especially in the United States).
28 Diehl, supra note 23, at 259. Contra Milena Makich-Macias, The Effect of The
International Monetary Fund Bailout on Growth Countries, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1755,
1757 (2001) (arguing that the IMF strengthens the international community by its
succinct understanding of the different perceptual, social, and cultural norms
unique to each economy).
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jurisdictional barrier between the IMF and its sovereign states.29
Under Article V(3), the jurisdictional barrier between the IMF and
sovereign states cannot be breached even in the context of
extending financial assistance. 30  Matters that are "essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the member state" 31 should not
be appropriate for inquiry, advice, or command by the IMF.32
However, in reality, the intrusiveness of the IMF's conditionality
can be illustrated by its structural conditionality covering pricing
policy, trade liberalization, privatization, the structure of taxes and
government expenditure,33 and the reform of the financial sector.34
The problem is that a state's domestic economic policies cannot be
separated from its international economic policies, including the
BOPs and the value of the state's currency.
35
3. ASIAN MIRACLE OR MIRAGE?: THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
3.1. The Crash
3.1.1. Asian Economies before the Crisis
In the past three decades, the rapid growth of Asian economies
has led many Western and Asian pundits to claim that the "Asian
29 See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 262 ("Even as the conditions for drawings or
stand-by arrangements became more refined, with phased drawings and
performance criteria, the implied jurisdictional barrier was maintained."). For a
discussion of the implied jurisdictional barrier, see supra Section 1.2.
30 See Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. IV, sec. 3 ("These principles
shall respect the domestic social and political policies of members, and in
applying these principles the Fund shall pay due regard to the circumstances of
members.").
[Flor instance, the Fund might say to a government, you must keep your
budgetary deficit to within five percent of your Gross National Product (GNP);
but the Fund could not decide or even advise on whether this prescription
would be carried out through a reduction in veterans' benefits, farm subsidies,
or road building.
Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 260.
31 See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 15, art 2, para. 7.
32 See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 260-61 ("The Fund could not prescribe,
much less condition aid upon, say, privatizing electric power production or
opening telecommunications up to foreign investment.").
33 These policies are consistent with the Washington Consensus. See supra
note 26 for a description of the Washington Consensus.
34 See Bird, supra note 20, at 283.
35 See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 261.
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miracle"36 was based on a superior "Asian system" and was
underpinned by uniquely superior "Asian values." Indeed, the
World Bank published a book entitled "The East Asian Miracle" in
1993.37 The extraordinarily high savings rate and government-
initiated economic development policies38 were characterized as
the common features of Asian economies that had shown
impressive economic growth records in a relatively short period of
time.39  However, only four years after the World Bank's
publication of the book, the economies of most Asian countries
collapsed dramatically.
Collectively,40 Asian economies have put an emphasis on
macrostability. 41 As in the Washington Consensus, trade was
36 Long before the crisis, at least one economist had argued that economic
growth in Asian countries was not a miracle and that there was no such thing as a
truly unique Asian system. See KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 22 (arguing that there
was nothing miraculous about Asian economies, if one means by "miracle"
something incomprehensible). But see STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 91 (arguing that
high savings rate and well-organized government policies were unique in Asia);
see also C.P. Chandrasekhar & Jayati Ghosh, Hubris, Hysteria, Hope: The Political
Economy of Crisis and Response in Southeast Asia, in TIGERS IN TROUBLE: FINANCIAL
GOVERNANCE, LIBERALISATION, AND CRISES IN EAST ASIA [hereinafter TIGERS IN
TROUBLE] 63, 63 (K.S. Jomo ed., 1998) (arguing that it is important to remember
that the development trajectories and levels of performance have differed greatly
throughout the region).
37 WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1993).
38 See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 91 ("No other set of countries around the
world had manage to save at such rates and invest funds well. Government
policies played an important role in enabling the East Asian nations to accomplish
both things simultaneously."). See generally THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST
ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Masahiko
Aoki et al. eds., 1997) (1996). But see generally Paul Krugman, The Myth of Asia's
Miracle: A Cautionary Fable, 73 FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 62, 65 (arguing that
many economists studying Soviet industrial growth came to different conclusions
as to what factors were responsible for that growth), available at
http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/myth.html (last visited Oct. 20,2003).
39 See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 90-92 (arguing that the combination of high
savings rates, government investment in education, and state-directed industry
policy was the key element to the Asian economies' success and that the IMF did
not give credit to this strategy devised by the Asian governments because it was
fundamentally inconsistent with the Washington Consensus).
40 Cf. Chandrasekhar & Ghosh, supra note 36, at 63 ("The Philippines was
never really much of a 'tiger' except in the matter of export growth, and that has
not translated yet into any major transformation of domestic productive
structures.").
41 Macrostability refers to stability on the macroeconomic level, but is almost
never defined. Roughly speaking, it refers to anything that goes well from a
macroeconomic point of view and is strongly related to inflation, its effect, and
2003
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important, but the emphasis was on- promoting exports, not
removing impediments to imports. Trade liberalization was only
gradually completed, as new jobs were created in the export
industries. As for financial and capital market liberalization,42 the
East Asian countries were not anxious to open such markets.
4 3
Rather than promoting privatization, some Asian governments,44 at
the national and local levels, helped create efficient enterprises that
played a key role in successful economic growth. The critical point
to note is that Asian governments took responsibilities in shaping
and directing markets, 45 while the Washington Consensus
emphasized decentralization 46  and a minimalist role for
government.
3.1.2. July 2, 199747
On July 1, 1997, control of Hong Kong reverted to China. Some
were worried that the reversion would lead to loss of some civil
real exchange volatility. See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 267 (stating that there was
no macroeconomic imbalance in Asia before the crisis).
42 See J.A. Kregel, East Asia Is Not Mexico: The Difference Between Balance of
Payments Crises and Debt Deflation, in TIGERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 36, at 44, 49
(explaining that multilateral agencies such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and the IMF were actively encouraging broad
liberalization, but given the high savings rates in most Asian economies and the
preponderance of foreign direct investment flows in others, and the relative
absence of demands for consumption finance, bank lending was directed in the
two areas).
43 China is a good example of limited and gradual financial and capital
market liberalization. See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 92 (commenting that China
"still ha[s] a long way to go" for financial and capital market liberalization).
44 Notably, South Korean, Indonesian, and Chinese governments were
engaged in market interventions during and after the Asian financial crisis.
45 See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 92 (explaining that the East Asian
governments set industrial policies to shape the future direction of the economy,
education, and investment policies to close the knowledge and technology gap, to
reduce poverty, and to promote social equality and social cohesion).
46 For a discussion of decentralization and its impact on macrostability, see
The World Bank Group, Decentralization NET: Macrostability (noting that "[a]t the
macro level, an important concern has been that decentralization may make
stabilization policies more difficult to implement, and indeed, may itself lead to
destabilizing levels and composition of overall public expenditures and public
debt."), at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/macro
stability.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
47 On July 2, 1997, the Thai baht collapsed, which started the "greatest"
economic crisis since the Great Depression. See STIGLITz, supra note 10, at 89
(explaining that the crisis spread from Asia to Russia and Latin America and
threatened the entire world).
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liberties in the city, but few were concerned about the slight chance
that the reversion would change the status of the city as one of the
financial centers in the world.48 In fact, many believed that Asia
had great growth potential. Indeed, no one knew that Thailand
would have to devalue the baht the next day,49 and that the
devaluation would trigger the Asian financial crisis, which in turn
would create crisis in Russia and Latin America over the next few
years. Although the currency crisis hit Thailand in early March of
199750 and the trade deficit increased, no one imagined that this
classic currency crisis51 would spread to the Philippines, South
Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The contagion from the Asian
crisis had a significant impact in the world economy; Russia
defaulted on its debt in 1998,52 which skyrocketed Brazilian interest
rates and terrified the U.S. bond market right before the turn of the
millennium.
3.2. Origin of the Crisis
3.2.1. Fundamental Economic Problems in Asia?
Although there is no consensus about what caused the Asian
financial crisis, fundamentals in Asia were not generally
problematic. Most crisis economies in Asia had been near surplus
on their trade balances, if not on their current account balances,
and had long-term records of fiscal rectitude. Moreover, their
48 See KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 2 ("[Tjhe transfer of power that day seemed
to proclaim the triumph... of capitalism-a system so successful, so dominant,
that even the People's Army posed no threat to business as usual.").
49 See id. at 93 (stating that when the Thai government dissolved the baht on
July 2, 1997, the baht price of a dollar soared fifty percent over the next few
months, even though typical calculations suggested that the baht would have to
fall about fifteen percent to make Thai industry cost-competitive). Faced with a
series of speculative attacks, the Thai government had two choices: (1) raising
interest rates, which would discourage foreign investment greatly; or (2)
dissolving the baht. On July 2, 1997, the Thai government had to dissolve its
currency because it ran out of its foreign exchange reserve. See id. at 90-91.
50 See Laurids S. Lauridsen, Thailand: Causes, Conduct, Consequences, in TIGERS
IN TROUBLE, supra note 36, at 137, 145 ("The currency crisis hit Thailand in early
march 1997 after a speculative attack on the baht in February .. ").
51 See KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 91-92 (stating that the baht devaluation was a
textbook-type currency crisis).
52 See STIGLrZ, supra note 10, at 199-200 ("The East Asian crisis spread from
there to Russia through the collapse of oil prices ... ").
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trade deficits were not great.53  Given that the fundamental
indicators5 4 looked healthy, the IMF and the U.S. Treasury held the
view that the cause of the crisis lay in the problem of internal
management.55 However, if corruption and nepotism were the
true cause of the Asian financial crisis, the subsequent economic
recovery would not have been possible without fundamental
changes. The fact that recovery from the crisis came without
fundamental changes demonstrates that the crisis was closer to a
simple "panic."5 6
3.2.2. Possible Causes
If cronyism and corruption in Asia were not the causes of the
crisis, what caused the sudden capital flight, sharp fall in currency
values, bankruptcy, and massive layoffs in Asia? A more widely-
supported view among economists57 is that the vulnerability of the
financial sector due to the under-regulated expansion of capital
and financial markets caused the crisis, at least in part.58 Several
53 See Kregel, supra note 42, at 46 (arguing that it could not have been
excessive private consumption that led to the crisis because imports were not
dominated by luxury consumption goods, the savings ratio was extremely high,
and banks were not financing unsustainable consumption booms).
54 See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 267 (stating that Asian countries had
experienced low budget deficits, relatively low public debt, inflation in single
digits, rapid economic growth, and high savings and investment rates).
55 See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 211 ("In the East Asia crisis, the IMF and the
U.S. Treasury quickly sought to blame the problems on the borrowing countries,
and in particular on their lack of transparency."); Walden Bello, Back to the Third
World The Asian Financial Crisis Enters Its Second Year, 27 Focus ON TRADE (July
1998) ("Washington and the IMF insisted that 'crony capitalism' or corrupt
relations between the private and public sectors was the main issue and that the
solution lay principally in eliminating corruption and achieving greater
'transparency."'), available at http://www.asienhaus.org/asiancrisis/third_world.
htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
56 KRUGMAN, Introduction, supra note 10, at x.
57 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 99 ("1 believe that capital account
liberalization was the single most important factor leading to the crisis."); G.K.
Helleiner, Afterword: The East Asian and Other Financial Crises: Causes, Responses,
and Prevention, in TIGERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 36, at 232, 235 ("[M]ost
[economists] now assign some responsibility for the crisis to premature financial
liberalisation [sic] and, in particular, liberalisation [sic] of the external capital
account...."); Bello, supra note 55 (stating that the IMF continues to push radical
financial liberalization, ignoring the mounting evidence that it was uncontrolled
capital movements that triggered the crisis).
58 See K.S. Jomo, Introduction, in TIGERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 36, at 1, 23
(stating that market liberalization in Asia not only reduced monitoring and
supervision of banking operations and transactions in capital and financial
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years before the crisis, many Asian countries opened 9 up their
financial markets, 60 which led to the undermining of monetary and
financial governance. 61 There was no development of adequate
regulation as demonstrated by massive short-term borrowing
abroad by the private sector.62
Some commentators have suggested that a moral hazard
involving over-guaranteed but under-regulated financial
intermediaries was the cause of the crisis.63  Most notably,
Professor Paul Krugman at Princeton University has argued that
the moral hazard problem not only distorted investments, but also
led to over-investment at the aggregate level and overpricing of
assets.64
Many economists now agree that a loss of confidence in the
market started a vicious circle of financial and economic collapse:65
markets, but also increased the scope for and activity in currency speculation).
59 See id. at 7 ("[The] Asian currency and financial crises... have been partly
due to financial liberalisation....").
60 International financial instability is more likely in a world of increased
economic interdependence and free global capital flows because of the reduction
of financial controls. For a general discussion of financial markets and financial
liberalization, see id. at 9-13.
61 See id. at 7; Chandrasekhar & Ghosh, supra note 36, at 70 (explaining the
policies in Indonesia and Malaysia).
62 See Yilmaz Akytiz, The East Asian Financial Crisis: Back to the Future, in
TIGERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 36, at 33, 35 (arguing that domestic banking
regulations cannot not prevent the excessive non-bank private sector borrowing
made possible by financial market liberalization and noting that a significant
percentage of East Asian private borrowing from international banks was made
by non-bank firms). But see Jomo, supra note 58, at 23 ("Financial liberalisation has
also reduced monitoring and supervision of financial [sic], including banking
operations and transactions, including those of a prudential nature.").
63 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Mat happened to Asia? Uan. 1998), at
http://www.pkarchive.org/crises/DISINTER.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
64 Id. (arguing that access to global capital markets allowed moral hazard in
the financial sector to translate into excessive real capital accumulation). Thus,
Krugman's point regarding the cause of the Asian financial crisis also relates to
financial and capital market liberalization.
65 See KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 97-98 ("[I]nvestors ... regarded the troubles
of one Asian economy as bad news about the others; when an economy is
vulnerable to self-validating panic, believing makes it so."); STIGLrrZ, supra note
10, at 94-95 (explaining the effect of self-fulfilling prophecies in Asian economies
during the crisis); Jomo, supra note 58, at 5 ("Perceiving the Southeast Asian region
as much more integrated than it actually is... the panicky investment decisions of
fund managers based outside the region ... have often been 'herd-like,' causing a
'contagion' or 'domino' effect throughout the region."); see also Chart P2: IMF
Prescription/East Asian Dilemma in TIGERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 36, at xiv.
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a feedback loop from confidence, to financial markets, to the real
economy, and back again to confidence. 66 Even the IMF has stated
that its priority in response to the Asian Economic Crisis ("Crisis")
was to help restore confidence 67 Significantly, Michel Camdessus,
then Managing Director of the IMF, openly stated that the IMF
sought to restore market confidence in response to the Crisis.68
4. SAVING ASIA?: THE IMF POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA AND OTHER
ASIAN COUNTRIES
4.1. Who Failed and Who Rescued South Korea?
On September 30, 1996, approximately thirty-four years after
the South Korean government first instituted economic reforms,69
South Korea joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD").70 Unlike other crisis economies in
66 The IMF agrees on this point. See The International Monetary Fund,
Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF, June 2000 [hereinafter The Role
of the IMF] ("[A] change in market sentiment could and did lead into a vicious
circle of currency depreciation, insolvency, and capital outflows, which was
difficult to stop. Contagion spread rapidly in the region after the devaluation of
the baht, as other countries were perceived by investors as facing similar
weaknesses that cast doubt on their credit-worthiness."), at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm#box2 (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
67 See The International Monetary Fund, The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis:
A Factsheet, Jan. 17, 1999 [hereinafter The IMF's Response] ("The IMF's priority was
also clear: to help restore confidence to the economies affected by the crisis."), at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
68 See Michel Camdessus, Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 6,
1998), 27 IMF SURV. 49,50 (1998) ("[T]he centerpiece of each program is not a set of
austerity measures to restore macroeconomic balance, but a set of forceful, far-
reaching structural reforms to strengthen financial systems, increase transparency,
open markets and, in so doing, restore market confidence."), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/1998/020698.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2003); Michel Camdessus, Remarks at the ASEAN Business Forum on Rebuilding
Confidence in Asia (Dec. 2, 1997) (arguing that strong macroeconomic
fundamentals and sound structural policies will give markets confidence and
therefore encourage long-term investment), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/1997/120297a.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
69 See KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 24 (stating that per capita income in South
Korea rose almost seven percent per year over the period of South. Korea's
economic transformation).
70 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
represents thirty member states who share a commitment to democratic
government and the market economy. The OECD states that it plays a prominent
role in fostering good governance in public service and in corporate activity. The
OECD has been called a think tank, a monitoring agency, a rich man's club, and
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Asia, the South Korean economy was large7' and relatively
sound.72 Nevertheless, it was forced to join the unfortunate club73
of countries receiving IMF rescue funds74 at the end of 1997.
4.1.1. High-speed Industrialization
South Korea's impressive and robust period of economic
growth 75 was based on an institutional framework in which the
government played a central role in setting economic and
industrial policies and had a close working relationship with the
private sector.76 The government not only favored strategic sectors
and industries77 by providing them with subsidized credit through
an unacademic university. See generally The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, The Overview of the OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/
document/18/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2068050_1_1_1_l,00.html (last visited Oct.
20, 2003).
71 See Nicola Bullard et al., Taming the Tigers: The IMF and the Asian Crisis, in
TIGERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 36, at 85, 100 ("[Pre-crisis] figures placed South
Korea as the eleventh largest economy in the World.").
72 See Ha-Joon Chang, South Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis, in TIGERS IN
TROUBLE, supra note 36, at 222, 223 ("[T]he current account deficit [in South Korea
on the eve of the crisis] was just over 3 per cent of GNP .... The Korean annual
budget has been largely in balance and gross public debt amounts to only 3 per
cent of GDP....").
73 Thailand and Indonesia received rescue packages from the IMF earlier in
1997. See Letter of Intent from the Government of Indonesia to Michel Cadessus,
Managing Director of the IMF (Oct. 31, 1997), at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/loi/103197.htm; Letter of Intent from the Government of Thailand to Michel
Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF (Aug. 14, 1997), at http://www.inf.
org/extemal/np/loi/081497.htm.
74 South Korea received a $57 billion rescue package from the IMF. For
details of the IMF rescue package, see discussion infra Section 4.1.3.
75 In thirty-four years starting in 1963, South Korea recorded a nine-fold
increase in per capita income. KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 24; see also Bullard, supra
note 71, at 100 ("Annual economic growth over the same period averaged slightly
over 7 per cent ... ").
76 See Bullard, supra note 70, at 100 (explaining that the South Korean
government had a commanding role in its relationship with the private sector).
77 For example, the South Korean government promoted the steel industry,
helping to create Pohang Iron and Steel Company, Ltd. in the 1960s. Generally,
the South Korean government promoted the development of heavy and chemical
industries. See Tain-Jy Chen & Ying-Hua Ku, Differing Approaches, Differing
Outcomes: Industrial Priorities, Financial Markets, and the Crisis in Korea and Taiwan,
in WEATHERING THE STORM: TAIWAN, ITS NEIGHBORS, AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISIS [hereinafter WEATHERING THE STORM] 111, 113-18 (Peter C. Y. Chow & Bates
Gill eds., 2000).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
state banks,78 but also protected them from foreign corporations'
competition in the domestic market.79 These incubated industrial
conglomerates, known as chaebol, were later pushed to compete
with foreign companies in the international market.80 The state-
bank-chaebol nexus played a key role8' in economic growth in South
Korea until the early 1990s. 82
4.1.2. Origins of the Crisis
The most important change in the South Korean economy in
the early 1990s was that the new government83 "abandoned its
traditional role of coordinating [and regulating private]
investments in large scale industries,"84 which allowed excess
capacity to build up in important industries like steel,
shipbuilding, automobiles, and semiconductors.85  After the
formation of the World Trade Organization 86 in January 1995,
78 Thus, these industries were able to obtain "preferential policy loans at
subsidized interest rates." See Peter C. Y. Chow, The Asian Financial Crisis and Its
Aftermath, in WEATHERING THE STORM, supra note 77, at 3, 4.
79 This is a classic protectionist trade policy, where governments promote
their export industries, while protecting their import substitution industries. For
a general discussion of trade policies, see STRATEGIC TRADE POLICIES AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Paul Krugman ed., 1986).
80 See Chen & Ku, supra note 6, at 113 ("Korean policymakers made it clear
from the beginning that the eventual goal of the [heavy and chemical industries
development] drive was to make these industries the mainstay of Korean
exports.").
81 See Bullard, supra note 71, at 101 (explaining that the South Korea's state-
led strategy was extremely successful). But see KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 37
(arguing that "the cozy collaborative relationship" between business and
government fostered private gain at the economy's expense).
82 Compare Tatsuo Yanagita, International Monetary Fund Conditionality and the
Korean Economy in the Late 1990s, in WEATHERING THE STORM, supra note 77, at 19,
36-37 (arguing that the seeds of the crisis were planted by the close tripartite
relationship among the government, state banks, and Korean industrial
conglomerates), with KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 22, 37 (arguing that theories
identifying the relationship as the root of the crisis are not very convincing).
83 In 1992, Young-sam Kim was elected the new President in South Korea
after over three decades of military regime.
84 Ha-Joon Chang, Korean Crisis Caused by Financial Liberalization and Economic
Deregulation, 89 THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE (1998), available at http://www.twn
side.org.sg/title/joon-cn.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
8s Cf. STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 118-27 (arguing that the apparent excess
capacity of the chip industry in South Korea was not truly excessive).
86 The World Trade Organization ("WTO") was established at the Uruguay
Round negotiations. The WTO is the only international organization dealing with
the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade
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South Korea was under heavy pressure to liberalize its trade
regulations. Moreover, membership in the OECD forced South
Korea to adopt a more liberal stance towards foreign capital and
finance.87 Also, it is important to note that South Korea followed
the IMF's strong recommendation with respect to capital market
liberalization during the early 1990s.88
Although there has been some discussion89 that the South
Korean crisis was caused by an inefficient, over-regulated, and
corrupt state-directed economic system, the crisis is largely
"financial" in origin, rather than a crisis of the "real economy." 90
By October 1997, it was estimated that non-performing loans by
South Korean enterprises had escalated to over $50 billion...
[making foreign banks) which already had about $200 billion
worth of investment and loans in South Korea... reluctant to
release new funds to the country. 91 By late November 1997, South
Korea sought an IMF bail-out.
92
flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible. See generally THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADING INTO THE FUTURE: WTO (2d ed. 2001).
87 See Bullard, supra note 71, at 101; see also Chandrasekhar & Ghosh, supra
note 36, at 72 (arguing that the crisis was caused by liberalization and
deregulation rather than excessive regulation).
88 The IMF Economic Counselor (also acting as the Director of the Research
Department) admits that South Korea was not warned by the IMF regarding the
dangers involved in capital market liberalization. See Kenneth Rogoff, The IMF
Strikes Back, FOREIGN POL'Y 134 (2003) ("Of course, in some cases-most famously
South Korea and Mexico - the fund didn't warn countries forcefully enough about
the dangers of opening up to international capital markets before domestic
financial markets and regulators were prepared to handle the resulting
volatility."), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2003/ 021003.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
89 See Chang, supra note 72, at 222 ("When the South Korean crisis first broke
in November 1997, many commentators argued that it was proof that its famous
state-led economic system had reached its limits.").
90 See Chandrasekhar & Ghosh, supra note 36, at 66 (stating that "South
Korea... appeared economically stronger than many OECD countries" when it
joined the OECD); Chang, supra note 72, at 226 (stating that the South Korean
crisis was caused by the high ratio of short-term foreign debt and certain high-
profile bankruptcies, combined with the fallout from the Southeast Asian crisis);
Bello, supra note 55 (arguing that crony capitalism in Asia could not have been the
real cause of the crisis because the practices of crony capitalism were very much a
part of economic life during the three decades that East Asian countries led the
world in GNP growth).
91 Bullard, supra note 71, at 102.
92 See Chang, supra note 72, at 224 (stating that in 1997, South Korea's foreign
debt decreased to $116 billion); see also Bullard, supra note 71, at 103 (explaining
that South Korea had to pay sixty-six billion dollars within one year when it asked
for the IMF loan).
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4.1.3. The IMF Comes to the "Rescue"
On December 4, 1997, the executive board of the IMF approved
a three-year stand-by arrangement with South Korea amounting to
$21 billion. Financing amounting to $14 billion had been
committed by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank,
and interested countries pledged to lend $22 billion, for a total
package of $58.4 billion.93 For the first time after the mid-1970s, an
advanced, industrialized country was subject to the tough IMF
conditionality usually reserved for developing countries. The IMF
negotiated the terms of a Mexico-style bail-out 94 "to restore
economic health and stability." 95
In addition to conditionality concerning macroeconomic
indicators such as growth in Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") and
an increase in usable foreign exchange reserves,96 the conditionality
imposed on South Korea 97 in exchange for the rescue package can
be summarized as:
(a) fiscal and monetary tightening, including a tax increase, a
budget cut, and an increase of the interest rate;
(b) institutional reforms, including establishing an
independent central bank, closing "bad" private financial
institutions, and accelerating the approval of foreign entry
into the domestic financial sector;
(c) trade and financial liberalization, and imposition of GAPP;
(d) review of corporate governance and structure; and
(e) labor market reform.98
93 Yanagita, supra note 82, at 24.
94 A Mexico-style bail-out program was the IMF's prescription for the
Mexican peso crisis in 1994-1995 and is characterized by high interest rates and
broad structural reforms. See generally KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 3845; Kregel,
supra note 42, at 44-47.
95 See Michel Chossudovsky, The IMF Korea Bailout, in THIRD WORLD
RESURGENCE 89 (1998), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/mich-cn.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
96 See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 268 (explaining conditionality imposed in
South Korea by the IMF).
97 IMF conditionalities are generally accepted in a Letter of Intent, which is
nominally a letter from the Finance Minister or a comparable official to the
Managing Director of the Fund, but is in fact a negotiated document. See id. at
161.
98 See Letter of Intent from the Government of the Republic of Korea to
Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF (Dec. 24, 1997), at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/122497.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
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The IMF conditionality thus not only included macroeconomic
policy, but also financial sector and corporate restructuring, capital
accounts, and trade liberalization. With regard to macroeconomic
policy, the IMF did not tailor its conditionality to the South Korean
economic situation; rather, it used its traditional Mexican-style
bail-out formula. Even though there was no budget deficit
problem in South Korea, the IMF imposed fiscal restraints,
requiring tax increases and government expenditure cuts. The IMF
stated that the structural reforms were necessary to restore both
domestic and foreign investors' confidence;99 however, there has
been widespread criticism of the IMF rescue package in South
Korea.100  For example, closing ailing merchant banks and
reducing risky assets made both more attractive targets for foreign
takeover,101 which had already been made easier by the IMF
conditionality that required South Korea to allow foreign banks
and financial institutions to set up wholly-owned branches ahead
of South Korea's financial liberalization agenda. The IMF
conditionality also required opening the bond market by the end of
1997 and opening domestic markets to cars and other key Japanese
industrial goods by mid-1999. These examples illustrate that the
IMF did not merely make sure that South Korea would recover
from the crisis in order to repay the IMF loan; rather, the IMF used
the traditional IMF formula of fiscal and monetary tightening,102
combined with nods to the special interests of foreign bankers and
business. 103
99 Hubert Neiss, Opinion, In Defense of the IMF's Emergency Role in East Asia,
INT'L HERALD TRi., Oct. 9, 1998, at 10.
100 See, e.g., KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 114-17; STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 113-
20; Bello, supra note 55.
101 See Chossudovsky, supra note 95, at 89 ("Western corporations have gone
on a shopping spree with a view to buying up industrial assets at rock-bottom
prices. The devaluation has already depressed the dollar value of Korean assets,
[and] the IMF-sponsored [banking and foreign takeover] reforms should
contribute to a further slide.").
102 However, in January 1998, the IMF had agreed to drop some of its earlier
conditionalities. The IMF dropped its insistence on a budgetary surplus and
adjusted the inflation target and the monetary growth target. See Chang, supra
note 72, at 229.
103 See Chossudovsky, supra note 95, at 89 ("The details of the [IMF's]
economic reform program... had already been decided in advance in consultation
with the U.S. Treasury, Wall Street's commercial and merchant banks as well as
with major banking interests in Japan and the European Union.").
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4.1.4. Recovery of the South Korean Economy
One of the key IMF terms was a labor market reform that
would allow companies to lay off workers, an action which had
previously required legislative amendments. 10 4 Combined with
the IMF's contraction policy, the IMF's conditionality on labor
market flexibility caused job losses, business closures 05 and an
absolute loss of purchasing power,106 contrary to the IMF's
statement that a social safety net was established.107 As a result,
IMF conditionality evoked widespread public anger in South
Korean society.
At the end of 1999, South Korea had "a stunning boom."108 The
IMF states that the success of South Korean economic recovery
provides the justification for the IMF's structural reforms.109
104 Specifically, the IMF conditionalities required the South Korean
government to: (1) clarify the circumstances and procedures for layoffs; (2) relax
restrictive legal provisions relating to private job placement and manpower
leasing services; (3) triple budgetary resources for an unemployment insurance
fund, including training support and employment stabilization; and (4) expand
unemployment benefits to cover firms with more than ten employees and to
increase the minimum benefit level to seventy percent of the minimum wage. See
Letter of Intent from the Government of the Republic of Korea to Michel
Camdessus, Managing Director of IMF (Feb. 7, 1998), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/020798.htm. Although these changes may
have been desirable, their effectiveness was dependent on concomitant changes in
South Korean attitudes regarding job security, taxation, the welfare state,
corporate recruitment, remuneration structure, and industrial training. Chang,
supra note 72, at 230.
105 An estimated two hundred companies per day have shut down during the
South Korean crisis, reaching a peak of three-hundred and forty on January 5,
1998. This translated into about four thousand more employees finding
themselves on the street every day. Korean Confederation of Trade Unions,
Unbridled Freedom to Sack Workers Is No Freedom at All, KCTU NEWS (Jan. 13, 1998),
at http://www.kctu.org/arguments/sp009.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
106 See Bullard, supra note 71, at 118.
107 See Neiss, supra note 99, at 10 ("A social safety net was established, with
the main focus on unemployment and health insurance, and retaining retrenched
workers, so as to maintain social peace in a difficult period of adjustment when
the traditional family support system has been eroding.").
108 KRUGMAN, Introduction, supra note 10, at vii; see also The Role of the IMF,
supra note 66 ("[T]he recoveries were unexpectedly robust, especially in Korea,
where growth reached 10.75 percent in 1999 as a whole.").
109 See The IMF's Response, supra note 67 ("[Tlhere have been some signs of
bottoming out in Korea .... ").
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4.2. Questioning the IMF Conditionality in Asia
As discussed in Section 3 of this Comment, the crisis that began
in Thailand quickly spread to other countries in the same region.
The IMF volunteered its "expert" advice not only to countries that
ultimately took IMF rescue loans,110 but also to Malaysia"' and the
Philippines, countries that did not seek IMF loans.
Despite what they were told by the IMF, the governments of
South Korea and Malaysia 1 2 took an active role'13 in the financial
restructuring1 4 of a large fraction of the firms in distress in their
countries and achieved dramatic results within two years. In
contrast, restructuring in Thailand languished despite the fact that
the country closely followed the IMF strategy.
One of the most controversial aspects of the IMF conditionality
in Asia was the fact that a double standard was used in the
treatment of domestic and foreign interests. 15 The changes of
foreign ownership rules included in the IMF's conditionality gave
110 Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea took rescue loans from the IMF.
111 Despite the fact that Malaysia has relatively little foreign debt compared
to other Asian crisis economies, Malaysian officials have considered adopting IMF
policies without seeking IMF loans. K.S. Jomo, Malaysia:from Miracle to Debacle, in
TIGERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 36, at 181, 191.
112 Malaysia imposed capital controls in September 1998, largely aimed at the
offshore ringgit (the Malaysian currency) market in Singapore and short-term
portfolio flows. Malaysian authorities believed that the offshore market
constrained their ability to bring down interest rates rapidly. Controls took the
form of requirements to bring the ringgit on-shore by the end of September and a
one-year holding period for repatriation of portfolio capital inflows. The latter
controls were replaced in February 1999 with a system of graduated exit levies,
and further relaxed in September 1999. See Paul Krugman, Saving Asia: It's Time to
Get Radical, FORTuNE, Sept. 7, 1998 75, 79-80 [hereinafter Krugman, Saving Asia]
(suggesting that imposing exchange controls may be one way to get out of the
crisis), available at http://www.pkarchive.org/crises/SavingAsia.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2003); An Open Letter from Paul Krugman to Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir (Sept. 1, 1998) (discussing the currency control strategy that
Mahathir adopted at Krugman's suggestion), at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/
www/mahathir.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
113 See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 118 (noting the IMF view that governments
should not take an active role in financial restructuring but should push for real
restructuring, selling assets, and bringing in outside management).
114 See id. (discussing that financial restructuring usually takes a long time
and is a slow process).
11s See Jomo, supra note 58, at 20 (arguing that the IMF's double standards
compromised its ostensible role as an impartial party working in the interest of
the borrowing country).
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enhanced rights to foreign investors 16 while domestic firms were
left to the mercy of the market. The IMF's bail-outs of the private
sector had the effect of socializing debt,"17 leaving the nations'
governments and their taxpayers to bear the burden of the private
sector's failures. The IMF promoted the interests of its major
shareholders, particularly the United States.118
Moreover, the IMF-prescribed conditionality accelerated
economic contraction, did not stabilize currencies, and did not
restore market confidence. The Washington Consensus and typical
conditionality applied in the Mexican Tequila crisis in 1994-1995
were used without regard" 9 to the specific circumstances120 of the
Asian economies hit by the financial crisis.121 Many economists
argue that the Asian economic crisis was not a typical BOPs crisis,
such as those that occurred with such frequency under the Bretton
Woods system, or the Tequila crisis.122
116 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
117 See Jomo, supra note 58, at 20 (explaining that the burden of IMF programs
fell "on the public at large").
I's See Chossudovsky, supra note 95 (arguing that IMF conditionalities in
South Korea have been abused to resolve outstanding bilateral issues in favor of
the American and Japanese interests).
119 See Jomo, supra note 58, at 19 ("Perhaps partly out of force of habit in
dealing with situations in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and elsewhere,
where fiscal deficits have been part of the problem, the same prescription ('one
size fits all') seems to underlie the recent IMF interventions in East Asia.");
Krugman, Saving Asia, supra note 112, at 77 (suggesting that the IMF's choice was
"inevitable: Given not just the economic but the political logic of the situation, and
given the success of a similar strategy in Mexico just two years before, how could
the IMF and the Treasury not try to repeat their earlier triumph?").
120 Individual developing countries can differ widely. They face different
economic problems, different needs for economic adjustment, and difficult
domestic political contexts within which adjustment is pursued (or not pursued).
Furthermore, they have different degrees of political, military, and strategic
importance. However, "[ilt is hard even for a moderate-sized institution like the
IMF to know a great deal about every economy in the world." STIGLITZ, supra note
10, at 34. In order to show that the IMF lacks detailed knowledge on individual
economies, Stiglitz explains that the IMF came up with a misguided policy
prescription for the U.S. economy during the Clinton Administration. See id.
121 See Paul Krugman, The Confidence Game: How Washington Worsened Asia's
Crash, NEW REPuBuc, Oct. 5, 1998, at 23 (explaining how smart economists in
Washington, particularly at the IMF and the U.S. Treasury, "did not apply
orthodox economic analysis" because they were focused on restoring market
confidence instead of economic fundamentals, and that the result "was disaster"),
available at http://www.pkarchive.org/crises/krugmanl.html (last visited Oct.
20, 2003).
122 Kregel, supra note 42, at 45. In discussing the origin of the Asian financial
crisis, Paul Krugman stated:
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The IMF's one-size-fits-all approach in Asia can be illustrated
by its conditionality for the foreign exchange. The IMF told the
Asian economies that they should defend their currencies, when
they should have been told to let their currencies fall freely.123 A
more reasoned response to the crisis would have been to slow the
withdrawal of foreign lending and to ease the conditions of
payment. The most appropriate advice would have been "rapid
policies to reschedule foreign loans to stop the mad rush to sell
assets and buy foreign currency." 124 Instead, the IMF mandated
increases in interest rates to extremely high levels, and the high
interest rates exacerbated the recession. In turn, investors lost
more confidence in these economies. At the same time, the IMF
failed to meet its stated purpose of promoting high levels of
employment and real income in all Asian economies that received
its loans.
The Asian countries, not the IMF, should have determined the
terms and pace of their economic reforms - especially the
structural reforms that required social, cultural, and legislative
changes. The IMF does not have the "right to substitute its.
technical judgments for the outcome of a nation's political
process."125 The IMF's authority in asserting certain
conditionalities is questionable in light of issues of jurisdiction,
standing, and sovereignty 26 because these conditionalities lie
[Ilt is necessary to adopt an approach quite different from that of
traditional currency crisis theory .... [Tihe currency crises were only
part of a broader financial crisis, which had very little to do with
currencies or even monetary issues per se. Nor did the crisis have much
to do with traditional fiscal issues.
Krugman, supra note 63.
123 As a result, billions of dollars from the IMF loan were spent to maintain
the exchange rate at an unsustainable level. STIGLrrz, supra note 10, at 209.
124 Kregel, supra note 42, at 60.
125 Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMF, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 20,
27. It is interesting that a well-known U.S. economist questioned the IMF's "moral
right" in arguing that the IMF was overstepping its bounds.
126 For example, in South Korea, the IMF not only reorganized the central
bank (The Bank of Korea), but also redefined the powers of the Ministry of
Finance. See Chossudovsky, supra note 95 ("A de facto 'parallel government' has
been installed .... Under the [IMF's] bailout, fiscal and monetary policy will be
dictated by external creditors. Monetary policy under the IMF's stewardship will
be tightened. Government spending on social programmes and infrastructure
will be curtailed."). Cf. Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 272 (stating that "the
boundaries between states and the international community" are, in some aspects,
"obsolete, at least for those countries that need the IMF, the World Bank, and
2003
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
outside the IMF's statutory purposes. It should also be noted that
the IMF's First Deputy Director, Stanley Fisher, stated in 2001, long
after the Asian financial crisis:
Notwithstanding the importance of structural policies in
the countries to which we lend, there is general agreement
that our conditionality in this area has sometimes been too
extensive and restrictive. This can be a problem both
because broader programs are more difficult to monitor by
the [IMF] and implement by the member country, and
because excessive conditionality may undermine a
country's ownership of the program.127
The IMF's conditionality in Asia went far beyond its stated
purpose in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF,128 given that the
Articles of Agreement do not mention trade and investment
liberalization, privatization, foreign investment, pension reforms,
or public sector austerity measures. In short, not only were many
of the IMF conditionalities in Asia economically unsound, they are
also questionable in light of the IMF's statutory authority.
5. THE IMF's CONDITIONALITY AND OTHER POLICY OPTIONS
5.1. The Role of the IMF's Conditionality in Asia: The IMF's Position
The IMF takes the position that its set of conditionality
measures imposed 29 on Asian economies-which included
related agencies" and that those agencies' authorities and restraints are, to some
extent, inarticulate).
127 Stanley Fischer, the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Remarks
on Asia and the IMF (June 1, 2001), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2001/060101.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
128 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; STIGLrrZ, supra note 10, at 42
("[The IMF] has repeatedly sought to extend what it does, beyond the bounds of
the objectives originally assigned to it. [The] IMF's mission creep gradually
brought it outside its core area of competency in macroeconomics, into structural
issues .... ").
129 The IMF claims that it never dictates but always negotiates the terms of
any loan agreement with the borrowing country. However, in reality, this is not
the case.
[Tihese are one-sided negotiations in which all the power is in the hands
of the IMF, largely because many countries seeking IMF help are in
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macroeconomic measures as well as structural and corporate
reforms-was justified and necessary30 even though it has
acknowledged that the economic crises were not caused by
macroeconomic imbalances.13' To the IMF, South Korean success132
is a vindication of the IMF's conditionality. However, it is
significant that the director of the IMF's Asia and Pacific
Department admitted that some other policy options would have
been better: "[A]n earlier decisive shift to fiscal expansion would
have been desirable. It would have been desirable to bring in
external commercial creditors earlier, and to start dealing with
corporate debt right away." 133
5.2. Policy Options and Recommendations
5.2.1. Policy Options
The IMF can potentially fulfill a useful role in developing
countries by offsetting sources of market failure that otherwise
would severely limit their access to external finance and by
improving flexibility in negotiating the conditionality. 34  In
desperate need of funds.... [A serious problem] for some of the poorest
countries, which have in any case little access to private funds, is that
other donors (the World Bank, the European Union, and many other
countries) make access to their funds contingent on IMF approval.
STICGLIZ, supra note 10, at 42-43.
130 See The Role of the IMF, supra note 66 ("While, with the benefit of hindsight,
the IMF's policy advice to these countries during the emergency was not flawless,
corrections and adjustments to circumstances were made promptly, and the
strategies adopted proved successful in restoring financial market confidence and
stability, and in achieving a resumption of economic growth....") (emphasis
added).
131 See The IMF's Response, supra note 67 ("[T]he difficulties that the East Asian
countries face are not primarily the result of macroeconomic imbalances.").
132 See Krugman, Introduction, supra note 10, at xi (stating that the IMF
claimed that the economic recovery in Korea is a vindication of the IMF's policies
at the end of 1999).
133 Neiss, supra note 99, at 10.
134 The IMF programs should serve as a seal of good housekeeping to attract
private capital. However, they have had the opposite effect because of the bad
track record of the IMF, the long-term involvement, and the bad signal IMF
involvement itself sends. See, e.g., STIGLrrZ, supra note 10, at 206 (explaining how
the IMF bailout packages make private sector foreign lenders demand even higher
interest rates from borrowing countries than prior to the bailouts). But see id. at
250 (stating that the IMF has recognized the failings of its big-bailout strategy in
the aftermath of the Argentina debacle in 2001).
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prescribing policies for many crises, the IMF has focused on
measures that tighten domestic credit, enhance fiscal revenues,
reduce governmental expenditures, and adjust the exchange rate. 35
For example, by the time the IMF had been convinced to introduce
additional flexibility in Asia, 136 conditions had already deteriorated
to the point that it was unlikely that there would have been
positive growth in the Asian economies in 1998 and possibly even
in 1999.137
As an alternative to the IMF's unilateral imposition of the
conditionality,138 the borrowing countries could decide their
economic reforms in the face of economic crises through fair
negotiations with the IMF. Given that one of the main purposes of
the IMF conditionality is ensuring that a borrowing country pays
back the IMF loan,139 allowing negotiated conditionalities could
increase the chances that the borrowing country will complete the
economic reforms. It is reasonable to assume that providing a
borrowing country's government with the opportunity to design
the program it will implement would significantly increase its
sense of ownership. To the extent that lack of ownership adversely
135 These are measures taken by the IMF in response to the Tequila crisis in
Mexico, which involved a classic BOPs deficit. However, it should be noted that
many countries now question the wisdom of the IMF conditionalities even in
cases of crises similar to the Tequila crisis. See Bird, supra note 20, at 295 ("[T]hese
policies.., failed to generate sustainable economic growth and BOP performance
[in Mexico]."). For a discussion of the IMF's typical policy prescription, see supra
note 119.
136 The initial conditionalities imposed upon Thailand, Indonesia, and South
Korea were reviewed and rewritten with more lenient terms on fiscal positions
and interest rates in the beginning of 1998.
137 For example, in February 1998, a month after the IMF adjusted its initial
conditionalities, "more than 100 firms were going bankrupt daily" in South Korea.
Chang, supra note 72, at 229; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 84 ("If the IMF
underestimated the risks to the poor [in the borrowing country] of its
development strategies, it also underestimated the long-term social and political
costs of policies that devastated the middle class ... ."); id. at 120 ("[T]he Asian
crisis was more severe than it should have been, recovery took longer than it
needed to, and prospects for future growth are not what they should be [because
of the IMF policies]."),
138 See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 42 (explaining that although the IMF's insists
that it never dictates the terms of any loan agreement with a borrowing country,
the IMF's negotiations with the borrowing countries are in fact one-sided, because
a borrowing country seeking IMF help has no bargaining power).
139 See IMF Conditionality, supra note 6 (explaining that the conditionality is
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affects completion of an economic reform necessary to prevent any
further 'economic recession, a sense of ownership should positively
affect a borrowing country's motivation to complete the reform.
Also, the degree of the IMF's input into the design of conditionality
could be varied in the light of a country's track record. This would
provide additional incentive for governments not to abandon their
programs in mid-course and would help alleviate the problem that
arises where previous failure does not exert any adverse effect on
future access to the IMF's resources. 140 Nobel laureate economist
Joseph E. Stiglitz argues that, as a public institution, the IMF
should improve its own transparency by setting its development
models and economic policies through democratic processes and
open discourse rather than behind closed doors.141 This approach
is consistent with the concept of "the right to know" 142 of the
citizens of a borrowing country, given that the IMF is not a private
bank but a public international institution.
Also, conditionality should remain strictly limited to exchange
rate devaluation and BOPs problems, as stated in the Articles of
Agreement. It would be ironic if the liberalization of capital
flows,143 which the IMF has now declared as its major objective, 44
140 This problem is illustrated by Mexico's default on the IMF loan in 1982.
However, Mexico was provided with yet another IMF loan during the Tequila
crisis in 1994-1995. See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 263-67.
141 See STIGUTZ, supra note 10, at 228-29 ("The absence of open discourse
means that models and policies are not subjected to timely criticism.... Secrecy
also undermines democracy."). But see An Open Letter from Kenneth Rogoff,
Economic Counsellor and Director of Research at the International Monetary
Fund, to Joseph E. Stiglitz (July 2, 2002) (criticizing Stiglitz's prescriptions for the
IMF's policies and defending the IMF policies), at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/vc/2002/070202.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
142 The citizens' basic "right to know" is consistent with the management of
modern public institutions. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2003).
143 See STIGLiTz, supra note 10, at 15 ("Worse, many of the policies that the
IMF pushed, in particular, premature capital market liberalization, have
contributed to global instability.").
144 Although the IMF has not officially amended its Articles of Agreement, it
is important to recognize that the Managing Director of the IMF, Michel
Camdessus, discussed capital liberalization as one of the IMF's global
responsibilities. See Michel Camdessus, Remarks at the Council of Foreign Relations
on An Agenda for the IMF at the Start of the 21st Century (Feb. 1, 2000) (arguing that
liberalization of capital movements is consistent with the concept of free trade
envisioned by the founders of the IMF, suggesting that an amendment to the
Articles of Agreement could enable the IMF to seek capital liberalization, and
explaining that the IMF had considered proposals to implement liberalization of
capital flows), at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2000/020100.htm
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were shown to defeat the IMF's original objective of promoting the
free trade of goods and services.1 45 The Asian financial crisis
suggests that the two objectives are interdependent but perhaps
cannot be achieved simultaneously. 46
As the IMF explicitly acknowledges, 47 the statutory purposes
of the IMF are the same as they were when formulated in 1944, at
Bretton Woods. Therefore, trade liberalization and capital and
financial market liberalization 48 should not be promoted in the
name of the IMF conditionality.
5.2.2. Reforming the IMF Voting Power
Rather than applying the Washington Consensus, the IMF can
develop diverse opinions and well-tailored policy options for
different countries by changing its own governance. Governance
at the IMF can only be changed through altering voting rights to
allow developing countries to have a meaningful voice in the
determination of policies.149
Currently, the votes are allocated on the basis of economic
power.'5 0 There are twenty-four seats at the table,'5' and each seat
(last visited Oct. 20, 2003); see also Jomo, supra note 58, at 19 (explaining that there
is a possibility that the IMF would amend its Articles of Agreement so that the
IMF has additional jurisdiction over the capital accounts as well as over the
current accounts of members' BOPs).
145 See Jomo, supra note 58, at 23 ("Flexible exchange rates and other related
developments have increased the scope for and activity of currency speculation.");
Kregel, supra note 42, at 47 (explaining that the increase in capital flows from the
developed economies to the Asian economies was based on a false sense of
security regarding the stability of exchange rates and the increased role of
financial institutions as intermediaries); cf. Jomo, supra note 58, at 24 (arguing that
capital market liberalization could not have been a sufficient cause of the crisis
and suggesting that little foreign exchange reserve made the crisis economies
more vulnerable).
146 See Kregel, supra note 42, at 60.
147 See The International Monetary Fund, The Origins of the IMF, in WHAT L5
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND?, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
exrp/what.htm#origins (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
148 See Kregel, supra note 42, at 48 (stating Asian countries were under
pressure from both the IMF and the World Trade Organization to modernize,
liberalize, and deregulate their banking and financial systems).
149 Stiglitz compares the current IMF system to "taxation without
representation," because citizens of the borrowing countries ultimately pay the
IMF loans back, but they are never given a democratic process to discuss and
choose their economic policy options. STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 20.
15O See Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. XII, sec. 5 (providing that a
member state's voting power changes according to the additional quotas that the
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speaks for a country or several countries.152 The United States is
the only country with effective veto power, 5 3 although collectively
European shareholders control twenty-nine percent of the voting
rights.154
If the current voting power is to be reallocated, however,
current members with strong voting power would have to agree to
give up some of their votes at the IMF. The United States is
unlikely to give up its effective veto. Likewise, the advanced
industrialized countries are not likely to give up their votes so that
the developing countries can have more votes. "China would...
have been willing to increase its capital contribution [to the IMF] if
that was required to give it more voting rights." 15 5 Thus, a change
of governance is not something that can be easily accomplished.
However, the proposed reform would provide a true democratic
process for adopting IMF policies through negotiations and
consensus among the member countries.
6. CONCLUSION
The Asian financial crisis tested the effectiveness and necessity
of the IMF conditionality, showing it wanting on both counts. By
prescribing the Washington Consensus without regard to the
different economic situations in Asian countries, the IMF hardly
fulfilled the tasks assigned to it: promoting global stability and
helping developing countries in transition achieve stability and
growth.
However, whether the IMF conditionalities were economically
sound was not the only question that the conditionality raised.
The IMF's role in response to a crisis economy should be limited
state has).
151 See The International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Director and Voting
Power, at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last visited
Oct. 20, 2003).
152 Only representatives of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, China, and Saudi Arabia speak for their
own countries. It is important to know that only the United States, Japan,
Germany, and France have voting rights greater than 4.5%. Other countries are
represented collectively. Id. The voting rights of developing countries are very
limited. For example, the voting rights of all African member countries are,
collectively, only 1.41%. Id.
153 The United States has 17.1% of the total voting power at the IMF. Id.
154 Id.
155 STIGLrrz, supra note 10, at 226.
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strictly to the purposes stated in the Articles of Agreement.156 To
do otherwise will only result in erosion of the borrowing countries'
economic and political sovereignty. To limit the possibility of
erosion of sovereignty, the international community should make a
reasonable effort to create a more democratic decision-making
process within the IMF.
156 In July, 2003, the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF published a
report, extensively evaluating the impact of the IMF conditionality in Indonesia,
Korea, and Brazil during recent financial crises and suggesting several
recommendations. Though the report did not mention the sovereignty issue
directly, the report made a recommendation related to that matter. See CAPITAL
AccouNT CRISES, supra note 9, at 53 ("A crisis should not be used as an
opportunity to force long-standing reforms, however desirable they may be, in
areas that are not critical to the resolution of the crisis.").
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